To improve the reliability of your responses, complete both cultural worldview tests before reading further sections of this article. Following the completion of the surveys, your results for both scales will be indicated in bold on the “Thank You!” page.
The above online surveys will be live only until 20.04.2016. If you still wish to determine your cultural worldview after this date, you will have to be do so manually via this file. These survey instruments were designed by Kahan et al. (2007), as part of the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale.
Since the 1970’s, academics have sought out explanations for why individuals perceive certain aspects of society as risky or not. For instance, personality theory claims that certain personality traits make individuals risk takers or risk averse, economic theory proposes that those who have wealth have lower perceptions of risk due to their ability to afford losses, and political theory suggests that demographic characteristics and access to power have a great influence on how individuals perceive certain risks (Wildavsky and Dake, 1990: 42-43). However, for the purpose of this article, cultural theory is of most relevance. Initially advanced by the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1970; 1978), the theory claims that there are two social dimensions of which can help explain cultural diversity and the dialectical relationship between culture and attitudes (cultural worldviews).
These two dimensions are made up of grid and group, each having two possible outcomes to which build a cultural worldview profile for individuals. Grid is understood as the relationship to power, where individuals can be either egalitarian, seeking to “(…) reduce inequalities between people” (Oltedal and Rundmo, 2007: 122), or hierarchist, upholding a belief that “(…) all roles and tasks are assigned, the division of labor is clearly defined and ‘everyone remains in the same post’” (Cerroni and Simonella, 2014: 121). Group, on the other hand, represents “(…) the outside boundary that people have erected between themselves and the outside world” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982: 225). Here, individuals can be considered as either individualists, emphasizing individual freedom and autonomy in various aspects of society, or communitarians, affiliating and contributing to groups as a form of social support and protection from vulnerability.
All told, the theory claims that individuals can have one of four cultural worldview profiles:
All theories experience limitations. Beck (2009), for instance, asserts “(…) it is difficult to square the claims of cultural theory to transhistorical, context-independent validity with its interest in precision, relativity and cultural construction” (Beck, 2009: 239), accusing that its foundational pillars are most likely based on an ethnocentric narrative. More importantly, Marris et al. (1998) have questioned the analytical purchase of cultural theory, claiming that correlations between the four cultural biases and risk perception are generally weak, and that placing individuals in these categories funnels analysis into generalisations that can “(…) only be used to measure worldviews at a collective level” (Marris et al., 1998: 644).
Beck, U. (2009) World at Risk, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Cerroni, A. and Simonella, Z. (2014) ‘Scientific community through grid-group analysis’, Social Science Information, 53 (1): 119-138.
Douglas, M. (1970) Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology, London: Barrie & Jenkins.
Douglas, M. (1978) Cultural Bias, London: Royal Anthropological Institute.
Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. B. (1982) Risk and Culture: An essay on the selection of technical and environmental dangers, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kahan, D. M., Braman, D., Gastil, J., Slovic, P. and Mertz, C. K. (2007) ‘Cultural and identity-protective cognition: Explaining the white-male effect in risk perception’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4 (3): 465-505.
Marris, C., Langford, I. H. and O’Riordan, T. (1998) ‘A quantitative test of the cultural theory of risk perceptions: Comparison with the psychometric paradigm’, Risk Analysis, 18 (5): 635-647.
Oltedal, S. and Rundmo, T. (2007) ‘Using cluster analysis to test the cultural theory of risk perception’, Transportation Research Part F, 10 (3): 254-262.
Wildavsky, A. and Dake, K. (1990) ‘Theories of risk perception: Who fears what and why?’, Daedalus, 119 (4): 41-60.
Two months ago, I wrote an article titled “Paris and Facebook: Fear, cognition and manufacturing consent”. Within the body of this article, one of Chomsky’s early publications Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media was referenced.
A few months before writing the article, I had seen an interview with the famed scholar, ground-breaking linguist and revolutionary political scientist. He mentioned a slight disappointment in the way people corresponded with him these days, preferring hand-written letters over emails.
So, given the coincidence of writing an article referencing his work, I decided to write to him… by hand. Today, I found a surprise in my letter box.
I found this letter to be sincere, on point and filled with powerful statements about the current state of the refugee reality.
Indeed, “the rest is a matter of asking who and what we are and aspire to be”, and that “the current callousness and brutality is painful to behold”.
At seven different locations, and within a twenty minute window, 128 people died in Paris on the night of Friday November 13th, 2015. As the chaos erupted in the French capital, so did social media. Live news updates, videos and testimonials rapidly filled streams, threads and rss feeds. Thirteen hours later, at 10:38am, Facebook launched a watermark tool to overlay the French flag over your profile image. This article focuses on this component and the implications that social media plays in risk perception and the dialogue on terrorism and foreign military initiatives.
FEAR AND RISK
“On a Sunday evening, 30 October 1938, a play broadcast on CBS Radio caused over a million Americans to flee their homes in fright, believing that the vanguard of an invading army from outer space had landed in the farmlands of New Jersey” (Bourke, 2005: 178). It was the frightening radio adaptation by Howard Koch of H.G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds:
“It began with [Orson] Welles’s voice, notifying listeners that, in the early years of the twentieth century, Americans knew that ‘this world was being watched closely by intelligence greater than man’s and yet as moral as his own’. This alien intelligence was ‘cool and unsympathetic, regarding this earth with envious eyes’ and was ‘slowly and surely’ plotting against humanity.” (Bourke, 2005: 178)
It is indeed true that means of communication and our interaction with mediatized information has vastly changed since the age of radio, but we should take care not to underestimate the role of emotions within the 21st century social media environment. A study on Twitter trends and emotions by Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2013) revealed several findings, including the observation that “(…) the affective dimensions (positive or negative sentiment) of political Twitter messages are indeed significantly associated with retweet behaviour in terms of retweet quantity, in the way that emotionally charged tweets are more likely to be disseminated compared to neutral ones” (Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan, 2013: 240-241), and that “(…) sentiment is positively related to not only retweet quantity but also retweet speed” (Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan, 2013: 241). This may explain why emotionally-charge subjects tend to become widespread trends across seamlessly interconnected social media platforms. As the discourse on terrorism is undeniably one of fear and anger, the contagion of these emotions on social media platforms is hardly a debatable observation. Although we may assume that the Internet is a vast and endless space, as trending dialogues occupy space on social media platforms, a funnelling and centralisation of discussion takes place where alternate narratives and news events take a backseat. On the same day as the Paris attacks, 26 people were killed and dozens wounded in Baghdad (Al Jazeera, 2015). One day prior, two suicide bombers left 43 dead and 239 wounded in Beirut (The Guardian, 2015). Yet, as Facebook’s ‘Pray for Paris’ watermark gained substantial fervor, Baghdad and Beirut became subtext events even though all three events had a common antagonist.
This has large implications in the way citizens of the Western world perceive terrorism, as discourse on its impact is too often confined to the geographic limits of Europe and the U.S. As Slovic and Petters (2006) characterize affect as “(…) the specific quality of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ (a) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (b) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus” (Slovic and Petters, 2006: 322) and affect heuristic as a “(…) reliance on such feelings (….) to guide judgments and decision making”, an important point must be made in regards to how social media guides these cognitive processes. Middle-Eastern communities face the plights of terrorism similar to those faced by the West, and a mediatized exclusion of these communities risks leading us to an affect and its heuristic based on polarization and dichotomy. As the cognitive process of cognitive-dissonance avoidance teaches us that “(…) it’s not comforting to entertain beliefs about what’s harmless and what’s harmful that force us to renounce commitments and affiliations essential to one’s identity” (Kahan and Braman, 2006: 155), it is imperative that identities of all who face terror be reconciled. If not, how can we expect sustainable solutions that harmonize our commonality of fear?
RESPONDING TO FEAR: MANUFACTURING CONSENT AND DOXA
In 1988, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman published Manufacturing Consent, a ground-breaking analysis of how the media acts as a vehicle for strong ideological propaganda. The general thesis of this literary work is that by intricate means and uses of media, the powerful elite can achieve public validation and consent for the various undertakings they pursue. The authors explain that as the media has the “(…) function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 1), a systematic and calculated use of propaganda has been applied to maintain equilibrium and status quo within “(…) a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest (…)” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988:1). Within the preface, Chomsky and Herman make reference to Walter Lippmann’s concept of manufacturing consent, claiming that although the sole aim and vision of media is not to produce public consent on systematic symbols, structures, policies and undertakings, evidence suggests “the propaganda function to be a very important aspect of their overall service” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: Iix). This may take place with what Cottle (2006) refers to as mediatized rituals, which “(…) are more productively conceptualized as an identifiable and variegated class of performative media enactments in which solidarities are summoned and moral ideas of the ‘social good’ are unleashed and exert agency in the public life of societies” (Cottle, 2006: 411). He explains that the “(…) media periodically intervene in the life of contemporary societies, their contending identities and contests of interest, and (…) can contribute to the formation of plural solidarities or ‘publics’” (Cottle, 2006: 411). It is argued here that Facebook’s ‘Pray for Paris’ watermark tool (willingly or not) acted as a mediatized ritual, of which rallied individuals into a ‘public’ operating under a unifying symbol.
The risk at hand is the creeping on of doxa, a concept developed by Bourdieu in his attempt to understand the acceptance of neoliberalism as the most advanced and ideal global economic system. He explains that neoliberalism has seen so much success and public consent because it “(…) has been steadily prepared over decades in France and the UK by partisan groups of academics, mediapersons, businessmen, and others” and that “ordinary citizens and the media ‘passively’ contribute to the entrenchment of neoliberalism as doxa, by accepting and repeating the claims of neoliberalism” (Chopra, 2003: 424). Arguably, a similar process has silently crowded the mediascape, where expressions such as ‘boots on the ground’, ‘war on terror’ and ‘threat to national security’, and symbols such as the Twin Towers, ‘Je Suis Charlie’ and Facebook’s ‘Pray for Paris’ feature have undoubtedly dominated the Western discourse on terrorism. Perhaps these lead to the production of manufactured consent for predominantly military endeavors in the Middle East, and perhaps not. Yet, as sociologist Ulrich Beck claims that “(…) risk is a way of controlling or, one could say, colonizing the future” (Beck, 1998: 11) and that “the greater the threat (or to be more precise, the social construction of the threat), the greater the obligation and power to change current events” (Beck, 1998: 11), it is imperative to address to question of terrorism with rationality, compassion for middle-eastern communities and without unreasonable paranoia, and not to give unnecessary carte-blanche purchase to military responses that have proven ineffective in stabilizing the region.
It was a hot summer day reaching nearly 50 degrees Celsius when I visited Mokattam village (informally known as “Garbage City”) in Cairo’s Manshiyat Naser district (see Fig.1). As I approached the area, the steaming scent of trash filled my nose as I made repeated and largely unsuccessful attempts to swat the flies hovering around my head.
Mokattam has over 50,000 inhabitants, most of them Coptic Christians that settled in Cairo about 70 years ago after leaving their agricultural roots in Southern Egypt . They work informally, as Cairo’s most important labor force of garbage collectors, sorters and recyclers.
An ostracized people from Cairo’s broader population, they are known as the Zabaleen, literally meaning “garbage people” in Arabic.
What is most impressive, however, is the efficiency at which they do their work: “(…) the Zabaleen, the traditional waste collectors of Cairo, have created what is arguably one of the world’s most efficient resource-recovery and waste-recycling systems” . Collecting from the heart of the city center to the greater metropolitan limits of Cairo, 4,500 tons (although other estimates go up to 9,000 tons ) of waste is brought to and processed in Mokattam village every single day, of which 80% of it is recycled and turned into sellable raw material . This is an astonishing figure when considering Europe’s 2014 recycling rates, where Germany takes the lead at 65% and the overall EU average tops out at a slim 42% (see Fig.2).
Aside from the efficiency factor, a vast and complex array challenges exist for the Zabaleen. The 7 areas of residence (Ein El Sira; Moatamadia; El Baragil; Tora; Ezbet El Nakhl; Helwan; and Muqattam) have now become contested spaces, where Cairo’s population growth and urbanization have led to a political push to displace the Zabaleen in order to gentrify the slum areas that have gained substantial real estate value over the last decades. Fahmi and Sutton (2006) assert that the city government made substantial financial contributions to livelihood development projects in the Zabaleen communities over the years, but in reference to Muqattam, this may have been part of a “(…) wider but hidden agenda involving urban redevelopment of this part of the city” . This has led to various resettlement schemes that have brought some Zabaleen communities to the outskirts of Cairo , placing them further away from the sources of trash that supply their daily bread and butter.
However, the Zabaleen are a strong and hard working community that has already surmounted previous challenges. In 2003, the then-President Hosni Mubarak made an attempt to liberalize the waste management sector by contracting out the work to multinational corporations. As this new approach required the residents of Cairo to change their sorting and disposal habits, its efficiency was compromised and became a failed project. However, it raised a multitude of questions and debates concerning the Zabaleen’ legal rights to Cairo’s trash industry. Since then, organizations such as Association for the Protection of the Environment (APE) and the Spirit of Youth Foundation have made strides towards establishing formal Zabaleen trash sorting and recycling enterprises .
As I strolled through the tight alleyways with towering windowless brick buildings, children played and worked amidst the rubbish. Although some would be appalled by the filth of this precarious environment, it was an organized place where laughter and the values of hard work and solidarity still thrived. No matter the issues of legal tenure or the informal nature of their work, waste management is a critical issue for all large metropolitan areas. And as Cairo grows as Africa’s second largest capital, it is difficult to conceptualize a Cairo without the Zabaleen.
To supplement the photos above, I suggest watching Garbage Dreams (2009), a documentary following the lives of three Egyptian boys that have grown up in Mokattam village.
 Mills, D. (2013) ‘Cairo’s “Garbage City” is a slum of 50,000 people, mostly Coptic Christians whose families came to the city from farms in the south seventy years ago’, First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, (235).
 Fahmi, W. S. (2005) ‘The impact of privatization of solid waste management on Zabaleen garbage collectors in Cairo’, Environment & Urbanization, 17 (2): 155.
At the time of this publication, nearly 70,000 refugees from Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan have settled in the ancient city of Smyrna, now known as Izmir . This summer, however, the city’s Basmane neighbourhood saw a mass inflow of transient refugees – a stopover for those pursuing the treacherous sea journey to various Greek islands in the hopes for a better life in the EU. Izmir was one of many cities and villages that hosted the nomad-like migrants, and is still doing so, but the numbers are dwindling as the weather becomes increasingly brisk and the sea angrier. Some locals offer a helping hand: food, clothes and supplies – organisations such as Halkların Köprüsü have done substantial work in this regard. Others remind the passerby of passages from The Stranger, the commoner and the hostile view of the Arab. Perhaps this fuels the transit towards Europe, of which for most of the summer comprised of 100 boats leaving the “(…) Turkish shoreline every night, carrying up to 5,000 refugees” . Risks were high, and as the media frenzy exploded with reports of drownings, smuggling and death, so were the costs.
Last night’s opening of the “Borders and Refugees” International Cartoon Exhibition was one of celebration and distress, of humour and misery. Hosted by the İzmir Karikatür Müzesi (Izmir Caricature Museum), in association with Multeci-Der (Association for Solidarity with Refugees), Konak Belediyesi and Don Qichotte e-humour magazine, the exhibition assembled heart-wrenching pieces from dozens of artists around the world. Uncommon to regular interactions with cartoons of which typically sit neatly within blocs of news text, having them as the centre-piece provided an intimate opportunity to speculate on symbolism and find meaning between the lines of fine pen strokes. For those living abroad, below is a glimpse of the exhibition. For those living in Izmir, the exhibition will be on until November 27th and is well worth your time.
 Personal communication, Multeci-Der, August 2015.
 Kingsley, P. (2015) ‘Lifejackets going cheap: People smugglers of Izmir, Turkey, predict drop in business’, The Guardian, 24 September; available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/refugee-crisis-people-smugglers-izmir-turkey-predict-drop-business.